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  Nola Semczyszyn

Abstract
Given the inaccessibility of the marine environment, the
closest many of us come to viewing it is at public aquariums.
Aquariums also provide us with rich aesthetic experiences, but
it is not clear whether we appreciate the marine environment
at aquariums. I present the dilemma of aquarium appreciation
as an inconsistent triad: 1) we treat aquariums as places to
appreciate marine environments, 2) aquariums are artifacts,
not natural objects, and 3) nature and art should be
appreciated differently. I argue that aquarium displays are
scientific models of marine environments with aesthetic,
educational, and scientific aims. My solution to the dilemma
involves accepting the paradox and modifying 2. By
appreciating displays as the kind of artifacts they are, we are
better able to appreciate the marine environment.
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aesthetic acquaintance, aquariums, environmental aesthetics,
models, scientific representation
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1. The challenge of aesthetics under the sea
Humans have always been fascinated by the beauty and
mystery of the ocean. It is expansive and changing,
potentially hostile, but necessary to life. In many ways the
depths that inspired stories of sirens and sea monsters remain
unknown. We are only beginning to understand the global
rhythms of the oceans, how they affect climate, and the extent
of human effects on marine ecology. While we know little
about familiar species such as whales, new and strange life
forms are cataloged every year as specialized vehicles allow us
to explore deeper waters. The cold, darkness, and pressure
make the underwater world as foreign to us as space, and
nearly as inaccessible.
Appreciation of the marine environment thus presents a
number of challenges to philosophers interested in
environmental aesthetics. Most people do not live near the
coast, and even those of us who do cannot spend long periods
under water. Learning to scuba dive is time consuming and
expensive, and the gear still allows us to spend only a short
time at any depth. Standing on the shore and looking into the
pools left by a receding tide or gazing out at the water
watching for the splash that signals a seal or a whale, we are
aware that another world lies below the ocean surface and that
it is beyond the access of our air-breathing bodies. With all of
these limitations on our perceptual experience, is there any
way to appreciate the beauty of the underwater world or does
its inaccessibility place it outside the realm of aesthetics?
In this article I investigate one of the ways in which people
have tried to make the marine environment accessible to
experience: through public aquariums. However, aesthetic
appreciation at the aquarium raises its own challenges. In

what follows, I introduce the dilemma of aquarium
appreciation for environmental aesthetics as an inconsistent
triad, and consider how it might be resolved. At stake are the
display practices of aquariums, beliefs about the difference
between art and nature, and theoretical commitments in
aesthetics. All of these are problematic, but none of them is
easy to give up.
In a recent paper, Tom Leddy argues that the appropriateness
of our aquarium appreciation can depend on how aquariums
treat nature as art in the context of display.[1] I do not think
that this adequately addresses the problem. Examining each
claim of the triad shows that debates over the context of
display, aesthetic acquaintance, and the permissibility of
aesthetic judgments for art and nature are all central to
creating the dilemma. I argue that the inconsistency can be
explained away once we have a richer account of the kind of
artifacts that aquarium displays are. Aquarium displays are
scientific representations that provide us with firsthand
experience of marine specimens. Given what aquariums
displays are, appreciating them as artifacts allows us to
appreciate marine environments.
1.1. Public aquariums and marine appreciation
In the twenty-first century most public aquariums are not-forprofit marine science centers focused on education and
conservation. Like zoos, natural history museums, and
botanical gardens, they are collection-based institutions for
informal learning. Historically these institutions have been
places for both scientific practice and public education.[2]
Aquariums not only teach visitors about marine science and
conservation, they also allow them to experience the beauty
and mystery of the underwater world through public display of
their live collections. No longer filled with walls of tanks
arranged taxonomically, today”s immersion-style exhibits
transport visitors to humid rainforests, sun-dappled reefs, and
through deep ocean twilight. Display tanks are contained units
arranged in exhibits that feature numerous tanks and focus on
specific marine regions or environmental issues. Designers
harness the beauty of marine ecosystems in displays crafted
to inspire visitors to learn and care about the oceans. Exhibits
use pictures, texts, and interactive elements not only to
interpret the display tanks and educate visitors, but also to
pique our interest and generate empathy and wonder.[3]
Visiting aquariums is meant to be aesthetically rewarding,
even as it is educational.
For many of us, aquariums are our first, and sometimes only,
glimpse at the world below the ocean surface. By most
accounts, public aquariums are treated as places to see, learn
about, and appreciate the marine environment. The question
aestheticians should ask is, “Are they?”
1.2. Aquarium appreciation: the dilemma
As I sketched above, aquariums purport to offer aesthetic
appreciation of the otherwise inaccessible aquatic world.
Viewing practices treat the aquarium as places where we can
appreciate the flora, fauna, and seascapes that make up the
marine environment. If aquariums do what they are
constructed to do, then the following claim is true:

1) Aquariums are places to aesthetically
appreciate marine environments.
However, even with a great deal of self-deception, we are
never tricked into thinking that aquariums are natural
environments. We are aware of the tanks, and that we and
the fish, invertebrates, and mammals exist in different
environments. Immersion is not meant to inspire delusion.
Aquarium displays are human artifacts designed to house
living creatures and to elicit certain responses from visitors.
Assuming a basic distinction between nature and artifacts, the
following claim is also true:
2) Aquariums are human artifacts, not natural
environments.
While we might applaud the aesthetic merits of the
architecture of the aquarium, such as the quality of the
displays, the lighting, decoration, and other features of the
aquarium as a constructed environment, the central focus is
the contents of the tanks that are designed to be beautiful and
inspiring.
If what we see at the aquarium is appreciated as if it were
nature and yet is not nature, then we need to explain what
makes it acceptable in this case to appreciate something X as
if it were Y. That we treat aquariums as places to appreciate
nature and know that they contain artifacts is at odds with the
dominant view in aesthetics that artifacts and nature are
appreciated differently. Environmental aesthetics came about
in response to differences between nature and art and
artifacts that affect how they should be appreciated.[4] While
there are many live debates about what (if any) the aesthetic
differences are, there are reasons to maintain two distinct
approaches.[5]
Since most of our aesthetic theories and ‘models of
appreciation’ have developed in accounts of art and other
artifacts, many rely on features of artifacts that are not shared
by naturall objects.[6] These include intentionality, genres and
media, artistic expression, and traditions of critical discourse.
Partially in response to the exclusion of nature from aesthetic
theories, environmental aesthetics has also developed around
differences between nature and art that are taken to impact
how and why it should be appreciated.[7] Nature surrounds us
and we engage it with all of our senses; it is not ‘framed’ into
clearly bounded objects of appreciation. Unlike art, nature is
not intentional and the perceptual features of the natural world
in situ are not shaped through human forces.[8]  
To appreciate nature ‘as nature’ or ‘as natural’ is not just to
perceive one more thing about it. Those who accept distinct
approaches to the aesthetics of art and nature often limit
appropriate or correct judgments to those that involve
appreciating something ‘as what it is’ or ‘on its own terms’.[9]
Artifacts and natural items are different kinds of things, and
each is thought to place certain demands and constraints on
the viewer that shape accounts of the aesthetic. This can be in
virtue of the viewing attitude we adopt,[10] the perceptual
features we experience as salient,[11] or by normative
constraints on our appraisal.[12]

Although the separation between art and nature in aesthetics
is not universally accepted, calls for a unified aesthetic theory
are still widely regarded as challenging a theoretically relevant
distinction in aesthetics.[13] Despite widespread debate over
the conditions that are necessary and sufficient to appreciate
both art and nature, a third claim is generally accepted.
3) Aesthetic appreciation of artifacts and built
environments is different from appreciation of
nature and natural environments.
Here we have the dilemma. We have independent reasons to
accept each of claims 1 through 3, but they are mutually
exclusive: any two together entail the denial of the third. It
follows from accepting 1 and 2 that we can appreciate the
marine environment at aquariums despite this environment’s
not being a natural one, but this is inconsistent with accepting
3 as it conflates natural and artifactual appreciation. The
conjunction of 2 and 3 affirms the artifactuality of aquariums
and the need for distinct appreciations of artifacts and nature.
However, it follows from this that aquariums should be
appreciated as artifacts in a way that is at odds with 1.
Finally, accepting 1 and 3 entails the denial of 2. If we accept
that aquariums are places to appreciate marine environments,
and think that nature and artifacts should be appreciated
differently, it is inconsistent to hold that aquariums are
artifacts.
Although there may be reasons to challenge each of the above
claims, there is no obvious solution to the problem. However,
since aquariums seem to be the closest we can come to an
aesthetic appreciation of the marine environment, this
dilemma should not be left unresolved. In the following
section I examine various solutions and the arguments that
have been given for rejecting each of the above premises in
turn.
2. Appreciation at the aquarium
2.1. Objects, objectification, and appreciation
There are a number of reasons why one might take the truth
of claims 2 and 3 above as reasons to reject 1. To appreciate
nature as nature it is not enough that we appreciate
something as if it were natural; it has to have come about by
natural forces. Since aquariums are products of human
artifice, we are wrong to appreciate them as products of
nature. Not only do their intentional features make an
aesthetic difference; they lack features relevant to
appreciating the marine environment. If the balance of forms
and textures, or the harmony of colors that make an aquarium
display delightful, are taken as deriving from natural forces
rather than human design, this changes not only how the tank
appears but also the kind of pleasure we take in it. For
instance, we can appreciate how well or poorly crafted a tank
is only if we take it to be an intentional artifact. A tank that
appears unbalanced, garish, or bland is more of an affront if
we recognize that these features are intentional and could
have been otherwise.
Though a display might share some visual properties with the
natural marine environment, there is no reason to think that

aesthetic properties are transitive between two objects that
look similar but are different. A photograph of a blighted
landscape can be aesthetically meritorious from how it depicts
that landscape, and a painting might have no aesthetic merits
as a painting despite depicting a stunning environment. Even
if many perceptual features are shared between a marine
environment and a display tank, it does not follow that
aesthetic features are also shared. This is particularly
important with nature, where it is not clear which perceptual
properties are the aesthetically relevant ones.
A second reason to reject 1 is that aquariums entail an objectbased model of appreciation that is inappropriate to
nature.[14] To display a natural object separated from its
original context is to ignore “what it is” and treat it like an
artifact, focusing attention on its surface features in isolation.
Viewing nature in this way changes its context and thus the
aesthetic properties we perceive it as having. At best it can be
appreciated formally as an abstract sculpture. To many
environmental aestheticians this object model is not
appropriate for nature appreciation. It treats nature as
something it is not, and in doing so it denies aesthetically
significant differences between art and nature.
On a weaker reading of this charge, aquarium appreciation is
considered trivial. Aquariums are just spaces to showcase
visually interesting species of marine creatures. This fails to
emphasize appreciation of their visual features as expressing
natural processes, and also encourages easy and passive
appreciation of the things we already find appealing. Equating
sensuous beauty with value furthermore stresses the
conservation of the exotic and formally attractive, while
neglecting more mundane creatures or environments.
On a stronger reading, aquarium displays make a spectacle of
nature in a way that is actively incompatible with respectful
viewing. Putting living things on display treats them as
objects that we can use however we like with no value beyond
pleasing our gaze. It casts appreciative viewing as an act of
dominance that reinforces an attitude of human superiority
over the rest of nature.[15] This changes both how things
appear and the nature of the pleasure we take in viewing them
by infusing aesthetic appreciation with the pleasure of
domination. This is problematic. It seems incompatible with
the disinterested attitude taken as necessary for aesthetic
experience, and even if one rejects disinterestedness, it is
unclear whether this kind of pleasure should be characterized
as aesthetic and not something else.
2.2. The importance of acquaintance
One way of resolving this dilemma in favor of aquariums is to
deny that the artificiality of aquariums interferes with visitors’
ability to appreciate the marine environment. Wollheim
maintains that a central tenet of aesthetics is the principle of
acquaintance.[16] This holds that firsthand experience of
aesthetic objects is required for aesthetic evaluation or belief.
While there is some debate over the possibility of aesthetic
testimony, our aesthetic beliefs are most often deemed to be
legitimate when they do not rely on any intermediary.[17]
One reason to consider appreciation at the aquarium
incompatible with appreciation of the marine environment

itself is that we have firsthand experience of the artifact, the
display tank, and not the natural environment itself.
However, aquariums, as well as other collection-based
institutions such as zoos and botanical gardens, do offer
firsthand experience of their living collections. One could
argue that it is the collections and not the tanks that are the
objects of appreciation. And so, unlike nature documentaries,
paintings, and other artifacts, aquariums do not violate the
principle of acquaintance. If acquaintance is satisfied and the
objects of our appreciation are the displayed flora and fauna
instead of the composite display tanks that house them, then
the artifactual nature of aquariums need not be in conflict with
appreciation of the marine environment for what it is.
Additionally, this seems to fit our viewing practices:
appreciative viewing at the aquarium is treated as appreciation
of nature. After all, we are actually seeing seahorses,
anemones, and other creatures in the tanks.
People visit aquariums for the fish, invertebrates, and other
species on display. Display tanks are treated as invisible
because they are filled with living specimens, which are the
things visitors go to see. Visitors might notice the design of
the tanks, the craft of signage and interpretive panels, and
their contribution to the overall quality of the exhibits, but it is
not the aesthetic qualities of the tanks that are the focus of
appreciative attention here. Acknowledging the role of
acquaintance is important in describing our viewing practices,
but treating displays as invisible does not entail that they have
no effect on our experience. Visitor studies at zoos have
shown that naturalistic habitats change viewer perception of
animals, and that such immersion-style displays, those that
remove visible barriers between humans and animals, reduce
disrespectful attention-seeking behavior in humans.[18] Since
display styles can affect attitudes and behavior, denying their
effect on experience is untenable.
We see living collections, but we see them in tanks lit by
artificial light, with artificial surge, and among landforms
shaped by humans. Display tanks are often “naturalistic”
because they are constructed to replicate the appearance of a
marine habitat, but they are not natural. Displays often
showcase multiple species within these naturalistic habitats
with interpretive texts that ask us to watch for certain
behaviors, such as camouflage, that require interaction
between species or with the environment. In these cases we
are to appreciate the environments, not only individuals or
individuals as constituent parts of the environment.
Acquaintance can only account for appreciation of the
individual flora and fauna, but our appreciation is often of the
“scene” and of the individuals as members of species.
Another problem with acquaintance is the ontology argument
raised by critics of zoos. Captive animals, they argue, are no
longer like individuals in the wild. The feeding, resting,
mating, growth, grooming, and other behaviors of captive
members of species X are altered in response to the artificial
environment to the point that the individuals lose features
essential to Xs in the wild. Though captive individuals may
resemble members of species X, they are so altered by
captivity that they become transformed into pseudo-Xs,

sharing only superficial features with their wild cousins.
Pseudo-Xs are not natural animals. They are something
different, artifacts created by the zoo.[19] If animals, perhaps
even plants, are transformed into artifacts by the process of
captivity, then our acquaintance with live collections should not
be mistaken for acquaintance with nature. Since they do not
express the same perceptual features, our aesthetic
appreciation of an X and a pseudo-X are different. Any
account of aquarium (or zoo) appreciation has to find a way to
meet or mitigate the ontology argument in order to establish
ex-situ appreciation of animals.
3. A proposed solution: appreciative pluralism
In a recent discussion of aesthetics and aquariums, Tom Leddy
argues that the prohibition against appreciating nature and art
in the same category should not be absolute. Even though
aquariums are not natural environments, this does not count
tout court against their role in the appreciation of nature. In
his discussion he offers an aesthetic pluralist analysis that
supports a role for aquarium displays in an appropriate
appreciation of nature.[20]
Leddy has two targets: those who think an original ecological
environment is necessary for appropriate appreciation; and
scientific cognitivists, who hold the view that the correct
categories in which to appreciate nature are those of the
natural sciences. In framing his discussion of aquariums,
Leddy sets up the problem a little differently from me.
Aquariums are places people can go to appreciate nature.
They pose a problem for scientific cognitivists, however, since
aquariums are artificial environments. From the scientific
cognitivist perspective, the best place to appreciate ocean
flora and fauna is in their original ecological context. One
might argue that putting flora and fauna on display in a
science museum is treating them as though they were works
of art.[21]
Leddy argues that not only is in situ viewing difficult in
underwater aesthetics, but it alone does not guarantee
appropriate appreciation, since there is no telling what people
will get out of an experience. He takes the “object model of
display” as what scientific cognitivists contrast with
appreciating things in the context of origin, and develops the
concept of “artification” in order to argue that aquarium
displays can be based around artistic and not only scientific
concepts.[22]
The artification of nature, seeing nature through art
categories, is not a category mistake according to Leddy. It is
one of many ways of coming to appreciate nature. Rather
than accepting a “monistic” model of appreciation that
condemns certain appreciative practices as aesthetically
inappropriate, we should assess each case according to its own
aesthetic, ethical, or evaluative merits and demerits. Seeing
natural objects in art categories can be creative, and
“metaphorical seeing” can yield deeper aesthetic appreciation.
If aquarium displays “artify” and aestheticize nature, he
argues, this does not immediately count against the
seriousness of appreciation.[23]

Leddy evaluates two examples of artification in order to draw
out an important distinction. The first is from an exhibit of
jellyfish at the Monterey Bay Aquarium called “Jellies: Living
Art,” which featured a blown glass sculpture called Seaform by
the artist Dale Chihuly.[24] Leddy argues that this style of
exhibit is not merely about seeing nature as art, but that it is
also about coming to see both through their interactions. He
says, “The curator probably wanted to get us to see how
viewing the art works and jellies together may benefit our
experience of each.”[25]
The second example is the stuffed animals and other kitsch in
the aquarium souvenir shop that presents cute and
sentimentalized versions of marine animals. Leddy contrasts
these two examples in order to differentiate between what he
calls “surface vs. deep artification.”[26] Surface artification
draws on the superficial features of art found in the souvenir
shop. “It treats things as art” argues Leddy, “but only with
reference to surface features of art. Thus, it focuses on
sensuous qualities, the decorative, the ornamental, and the
stylish.”[27] By contrast, deep artification is that which
“draws on features of art related to meaning, selfconsciousness, reflection on one”s culture, and exploration of
the human condition.”[28] While both deep and surface
artification can aestheticize non-art objects, they do so in
different ways that can be more or less appropriate, enjoyable,
and ethical depending on the situation.
3.1. Problems with Leddy”s account
Artification is undoubtedly a useful development, but it does
not solve the problem of aquariums. For one, Leddy is wrong
to think that the dilemma of aquarium appreciation only holds
for scientific cognitivists, since scientific cognitivists are not
alone in accepting my claim 3, above. One can hold that
nature and art should be appreciated differently without
accepting that scientific categories are the only correct
appreciative categories for nature. Naturalistic aquarium
displays are still artifacts, and however much scientific
information one is offered by a display, it fails to be a natural
environment.
Leddy's account treats display tanks as vessels presenting
natural objects whose sensory properties can be viewed in
either artistic-cultural or natural-scientific categories. In
casting “displaying nature” as equivalent to “treating it like
art,” Leddy characterizes the artifactuality of aquariums as
equivalent to the weak reading of the object model of
appreciation. The artifactuality of aquariums (and the
dilemma) can then be explained away by rejecting the
prohibition against appreciating art and nature in the same
way. Emphasizing deep over surface artification can dismiss
lingering concerns about appropriate appreciation and its
connection to respecting nature. However, the artifactuality of
aquariums is independent of the permissibility of appreciative
categories.
Leddy accepts that aquariums are places where we go to view
nature. Yet in his account aquarium displays and souvenir
shop items both count as artifying nature, despite the fact that
the displays offer us firsthand experience of live collections. Of
the “kitsch” souvenir shop items he says, “It is artification in

the sense that non-art things, for example fish and seahorses, are turned into something art-like through the medium
of artistic representation.”[29] Leddy faces a dilemma: either
he tacitly accepts the distinction between art and nature that
he claims to deny, or his account offers no clear role for live
collections at the aquarium. If he thinks that by seeing
sculptures, video displays, and art installations we can
appreciate fish and seahorses without actually looking at fish
and seahorses, then it follows that we can appreciate nature
without an acquaintance with live collections.
While this conclusion might cheer opponents of live collections,
it creates a problem for Leddy: it is not only at odds with
viewing practices; it assumes a prior distinction between
natural objects and artifacts. We have to conceptualize
’seahorse’ as a certain kind of natural thing prior to
experiencing the visual properties of the artified object as
being related to seahorses at all. Leddy must either accept
that aquariums are not places to see nature, or (insofar as
“seahorse” is a natural history category) that some natural
historical categorization is necessary for either deep or surface
artification at the aquarium.
Yet, comparing display institutions can help determine the
aesthetically relevant features of displays, and how artistic and
scientific contexts differ in their treatment of objects of
appreciation.
4. Contexts of appreciation and institutions of display
4.1. How aquariums differ from art galleries
Art galleries and aquariums both offer us firsthand experience
of their collections. However, their viewing and collecting
practices treat acquaintance and conceptualization differently.
Usually when we visit an art gallery we go to see and
appreciate individual works of art. A gallery’s collection is
made up of individual works, each with its own aesthetic
value. We would not be satisfied if replicas or photographs
replaced them because acquaintance with individual works is
taken to be necessary for appreciation of works of art.[30] We
develop art historical categories through seeing many
individual works and coming to note standard features.
Though visiting art galleries also allows us to broaden or
deepen our art historical knowledge and develop critical
abilities, individual works are collected for their aesthetic
value, not to help satisfy these other viewing purposes. This is
not the case at the aquarium.
Aquariums do not mainly showcase individual creatures so
visitors can appreciate their vivid, exotic, beautiful, or delicate
features. Much aquarium programming focuses on species and
habitats, not individuals. An otherwise empty tank might be
the best way to get a close look at a fish, but this is precisely
the kind of display practice aquariums have moved away from
because facilitating acquaintance with individual creatures is
not considered meritorious in a display. Naturalistic habitats
are aesthetically relevant parts of the display that are not just
constructed to please viewers but to simulate conditions
sufficient for the animals to thrive. Seeing the individual
creatures on display is not only meant to enrich our
understanding and appreciation of those individuals but also of

the marine environment more broadly: from experiencing
some seahorse’s elegance, to recognizing the value of
preserving seahorse habitat outside of the aquarium. This
seems to require using individuals to stand in for their species
in order to foster aesthetic generalizations.
Curatorship of exhibits at either art galleries or aquariums
might emphasize certain perceptual or aesthetic features, or
draw our attention to particular historical or ecological
relationships. Whether display tanks are presented in ways
that emphasize artistic or scientific concepts, the husbandry of
the animals, the construction of the tanks, and the role of
individual creatures in aquarium collections are all grounded in
the marine sciences.
4.2. How aquariums differ from the wild
One of the ways in which the marine life that we see in
aquariums differs from what we see in the wild is that the
creatures in the aquarium are individuals, but they are also
specimens. At the Vancouver Aquarium, all of the Beluga
whales have names and their individual appearances,
characteristics, preferences, and habits are part of how they
are presented to visitors in both the exhibit signage and
interpretative talks. However, they are not there merely to be
appreciated as individuals. They are also studied, fed, cared
for, and interpreted as beluga whales. Each whale is both an
individual and an exemplar of the species whose defining
qualities also constitute part of the interpretation. This is what
it means to be a specimen within a collection-based scientific
institution. Visitors are acquainted with each whale and learn
to see the whales as both individuals and members of a
species. To ignore the individuality of each whale and our
acquaintance with it as such is to lose the basis for aesthetic
appreciation; we might as well read a book about belugas. To
ignore what individuals share is to ignore the educational and
scientific mission of aquariums and the purpose of live
collections.
In the wild we might not know what is typical of a habitat,
what is necessary for the survival of the creatures that live
there, or if what we see is evidence of environmental health or
decay. In display tanks habitats are designed to both support
and showcase marine life. They are constructed to exhibit
typical features but are also idealized. Species are separated
in order to avoid predation in displays. Habitats are often
spatially condensed, exhibiting more biological density than
one would see in the wild. Seascape features are chosen for
their visual appearance and plants are arranged to achieve a
certain look. The habitats are aestheticized, but only within
the bounds of typicality for that type of environment, so their
beauty must reflect that of its environment.
Although aestheticisation of marine environments may be part
of aquarium practice, it is not primarily through artification or
the object model of appreciation. It is based on marine
biological knowledge as well as principles of display and
interpretation developed for public science. The artifactuality
of aquariums does not fit the classic distinction between
nature and art. Aquarium displays are, rather, interstitial
objects. Between nature and pure artifice, they are objects
that demand a different sort of appreciative category that

accounts for their scientific, educational, and aesthetic criteria.
Since aquarium displays are artifacts, they fall under
prescriptions to appreciate them as products of intentional
human practices, and to do so requires an understanding of
their artifactuality. Accounting for aquarium displays in marine
appreciation requires a precise theory of their artifactual kind.
This should include the purpose they are designed to fulfill
and what makes them successful artifacts of that kind.
4.3. Aquarium displays as scientific representations
Aquarium displays should be considered scientific
representations of marine environments. They are
representations because they stand in for the environment, so
that seeing the display is meant to be like seeing the
environment. The features of displays are constrained by and
meant to reflect those of the target environment in such a way
that, if the environment had been different, the display would
also have been different. Displays do not present each and
every feature of the environment they represent, they are
interpretations. Accordingly, they present a certain
understanding of that environment both by the properties they
represent and those they leave out. As scientific
representations, aquarium displays are best considered as
physical models of marine environments that simplify, idealize,
and exemplify the visual, ecological, and aesthetic properties
of those environments. Considering aquarium displays as
representational models clarifies their role in aquariums and
their success conditions.
Modeling in displays aims to establish a kind of isomorphic
similarity between the environmental conditions of the
environments and those represented by the tanks, but this is
not just based on appearance. The similarity between
aquarium displays and the environments they represent is not
merely at the level of visually appealing features but also at
that of the underlying explanations for these appearances.
Display tanks are intended to be beautiful and educational but
they also serve as research sites. Aquarium science has long
been a way for scientists to understand species but they are
also useful for understanding ecological interaction. Both inhouse researchers and collaborators use aquarium tanks to
understand the requirements of species and the balance of
particular ecosystems. This is often an outgrowth of animal
husbandry; however, it also informs considerations of merit in
displays.
For example, the giant green anemone requires certain surge,
light, water temperature, and nutrient conditions to thrive and
to display its characteristic brilliant color. Good displays have
specimens that are true to type and habitats that allow
individuals to display typical features of the species. A giant
green anemone that is pale and limp is not displaying its
typical features, so it does not serve as a good exemplar of
the species. This could be because it is idiosyncratically pale
or because there is something inadequate in the habitat. A
display that fails to show typical features or that fails to
interpret idiosyncratic features fails in its purpose.
Although they may be idealized and crafted to be visually
pleasing, aestheticisation cannot occur at the expense of
accuracy. For this, reason mixing species that would not

coexist naturally is frowned upon in displays. So is adding
fanciful ornaments, though some displays feature bottles and
other human debris if those are frequently found in an
environment.
In artistic representations of the natural world, accuracy is not
so meritorious. Scientific or ecological accuracy is no more a
merit in landscape painting than in abstract painting and can,
in fact, count as an aesthetic demerit if it interferes with other
aesthetic features. A landscape painting can be a good
painting even if it misrepresents the scene or combines plants
that would never co-exist. An aquarium display that mixed
species might be beautiful but it would suffer demerits as a
display. In other scientific representations, accuracy can count
as a merit or a demerit. In biological drawings, accuracy must
always be balanced against simplicity, since the purpose of
these drawings is often educational. Natural history
illustrations represent the typical features of species and
computational models represent ecosystem relationships, but
their accuracy does not also consist in sustaining life. The
accuracy of aquarium displays is entwined with the typicality of
the specimens they house and the environmental conditions
that sustain them.
However, aquarium displays are not just models assessed on
accuracy. Public display and education are also part of their
function. If our appreciative attention takes displays merely as
presenting individuals without considering that they are
artifacts based on marine biological knowledge and practice,
we miss the point that these are living creatures existing in a
sort of community and serving scientific purposes. Even when
an exhibit does not offer scientific information in the text, a
good exhibit encourages meaningful visual engagement and
conceptualization, not mere spectatorship. It should engage
us with the individuals and the habitat but also afford new
ways to think, imagine, and connect our experience with the
broader environment. This adheres to principles of
interpretation. The features that make aquarium displays
successful as models in public institutions are close to what
allows them to be objects for appropriate appreciation of the
marine environment.
5. Artifacts for marine appreciation
At the beginning of this paper I suggested that the
inaccessibility of the underwater world makes it problematic for
aestheticians and that public aquariums purport to make the
marine environment accessible to us. However problematic
aquarium appreciation might be, displays are representations
of environments that provide firsthand experience with the
features considered to constitute those environments, at least
insofar as they are understood by marine biological science.
This is not to say that scientific concepts are required to
appreciate the natural world, but that the displays express
years of research into the necessary components of an
environment and experienced observation of these
components. This captures not only the functional
components of the environment, but the aesthetic features as
well.
By appreciating the tanks as naturalistic models, we are able
to appreciate the marine environment they exemplify.

Aquarium displays afford us visual access to environments.
Though that access is limited and mediated, it is no more so
than scuba diving or film. Furthermore, this mediation is not
inappropriate for what we are experiencing. By preserving the
essential ecological properties and interrelations of the
environment, many of the aesthetic properties are also
maintained. In the absence of other means to appreciate the
marine environment, public aquarium displays offer us a nontrivial way of accessing non-accidental shared features of the
environment based on extensive research, experienced
observation, and measured typicality.
There are a few important caveats to make here. The first
point is that not all species are equally suited to life on display
and the needs of animals should be the priority.[31] Leddy is
right that we should be particularists about this matter. If an
animal suffers from being on display, it will never be a good
specimen. If the habitat is not sufficient for the animal to
thrive and express itself, then it cannot be a good display. If
an animal is displayed in such a way that it appears
disrespected or undignified, this cannot offer viewers an
appropriate aesthetic experience of the species.[32]           
Demonstration gardens, zoos, and other displays that cross
boundaries between art and science or between nature and
artifice challenge our notions of aesthetics and our
appreciative engagement with nature. These displays teach
skills in looking that are applicable to appropriate appreciation
in any environment, natural or otherwise, and those skills are
important and tied to perceiving the beauty of the natural
world. This is scientific education that builds on visual
engagement with an exemplary display and provides aesthetic
training to our capabilities for appreciation. It gives aesthetic
training that is applicable to our general appreciative
capabilities.[33]

Nola Semczyszyn
nola.semczyszyn@fandm.edu
Nola Semczyszyn is a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in
Environmental Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at
Franklin & Marshall College. She works on visual
representation at the intersection of aesthetics and philosophy
of science.
Published on April 29, 2013.

Endnotes
[1] Thomas Leddy, “Aestheticisation, Artification, and
Aquariums,” Contemporary Aesthetics, Special Volume 4,
2012.
[2] Theme parks that feature dolphin and whale shows have a
different history. For a history of North American public
aquariums see Jerry Ryan, The Forgotten Aquariums of
Boston, published by the New England Aquarium and available

on their website: www.neaq.org
[3] See Freeman Tilden, Interpreting our Heritage (North
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1957). This book
established interpretive principles that are still used across
North America.
[4] Ronald Hepburn, “Contemporary Aesthetics and the
Neglect of Natural Beauty,” in The Aesthetics of Natural
Environments, ed. A. Carlson and A. Berleant (Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2004), pp. 43—62.
[5] This is historically situated in Emily Brady, Aesthetics of the
Natural Environment, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2003).
[6] Allen Carlson, "Appreciation and the Natural Environment,"
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 37 (1979), 267—276.
[7] Ronald Hepburn, “Contemporary Aesthetics and the
Neglect of Natural Beauty,” in The Aesthetics of Natural
Environments, ed. A. Carlson and A. Berleant (Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2004), pp. 43—62.
[8] Ronald Hepburn, “Contemporary Aesthetics and the
Neglect of Natural Beauty,” also discussed in detail in Allen
Carlson, “Appreciation and the Natural Environment.”
[9] Discussions about nature include: Allen Carlson, “Nature,
Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity,” Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism, 40 (1981), 15–27. Yuriko Saito,
“Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms,” Environmental Ethics,
20, (1998), 135–149. For comparison with art see Malcolm
Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) especially chapter 3, “Nature, Art,
Aesthetic Properties and Aesthetic Values.” Kendall Walton,
“Categories of Art,” Philosophical Review, 79 (1970), 334–367.
[10] Ronald Hepburn, “Trivial and Serious in Aesthetic
Appreciation of Nature,” in Landscape, Natural Beauty and the
Arts, ed. S. Kemal and I. Gaskell, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993) 65—80.
[11] See Walton, “Categories of Art;” Allen Carlson,
"Appreciation and the Natural Environment;" and Glenn
Parsons, “Nature Appreciation, Science, and Positive
Aesthetics;” in British Journal of Aesthetics, 42 (2002), 279–
295.
[12] For a variety of views on the normative side of aesthetic
judgments of nature see: Emily Brady, “Imagination and the
Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature,” The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism, 56 (1998), 139—147; Malcolm Budd, The
Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature; Allen Carlson, Nature,
Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity; John Fisher, “What the
Hills are Alive with: In Defense of the Sounds of Nature,“ The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56 (1998), 167—179;
Ronald Hepburn, “Trivial and Serious;” Glenn Parsons, “Nature
Appreciation, Science, and Positive Aesthetics,” British Journal
of Aesthetics, 42, (2002), 279–295; Holmes Rolston III, "Does
Aesthetic Appreciation of Landscapes Need to be ScienceBased?" British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (4), 374—386.

[13] For discussion of this see Arnold Berleant, Aesthetics and
Environment, Theme and Variations on Art and Culture
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Arnold Berleant, “The Aesthetics
of Art and Nature,” in Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts,
ed. S. Kemal and I. Gaskell, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993) pp. 228—243; Thomas Heyd,
Encountering Nature: Toward an Environmental Culture
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
[14] Allen Carlson, "Appreciation and the Natural
Environment," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 37
(1979), 267—276.
[15] While little is said about aquariums, there is an extensive
literature that examines the relationship between humans and
animals at the zoo. On what I call the ‘strong reading’ of the
object model see: Ralph Acampora, “Zoos and Eyes:
Contesting Captivity and Seeking Successor Practices,” Society
& Animals, 13, 1 (2005), 69—88; John Berger, “Why Look at
Animals?” About Looking (London: Writers and Readers,
1980), pp. 1–26; David Hancocks, A Different Nature: The
Paradoxical World of Zoos and Their Uncertain Future
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Nigel
Rothfels, Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
[16] Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd edition,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1980).
[17] For recent overviews of the literature on aesthetic
testimony see: Robert Hopkins, “How to Form Aesthetic
Belief: Interpreting the Acquaintance Principle,” Postgraduate
Journal of Aesthetics, 3, 3 (2006), 85–99; Brian Laetz, “A
Modest Defense of Aesthetic Testimony,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66, 4 (2008), 355–63; Aaron
Meskin, “Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn From
Others About Beauty and Art?” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 69, 1 (2004), 65–91; Jon Robson,
“Aesthetic Testimony,” Philosophy Compass, 7, 1 (2012), 1–
10.
[18] Eduardo J. Fernandez, et al., “Animal–visitor interactions
in the modern zoo: Conflicts and interventions,” Applied
Animal Behaviour Science, 120, (2009), 1–8.
[19] Keekok Lee, Zoos: A philosophical tour, (Palgrave
McMillan, 2006). Versions of this argument also appear in
Acampora, Berger, and Hancock’s work mentioned in note 7.
[20] Thomas Leddy, “Aestheticisation, Artification, and
Aquariums,” Contemporary Aesthetics, Special Volume 4,
2012.
[21] Ibid., Section 2.1.
[22] Loc. cit.
[23] Ibid., Section 2.3.
[24] Loc. cit.
[25] Ibid., Section 2.1.
[26] Ibid., Section 2.5.

[27] Loc. cit.
[28] Loc. cit.
[29] Ibid., Section 2.4.
[30] Complications arise with multiples and allographic rather
than autographic works, but the fact remains that art galleries
collect individuals for the purpose of appreciation of those
individuals as individuals.
[31] Thanks to Ari Whiteman for pointing out the importance
of this constraint.
[32] Though the complicated biological and ethical debates
about captivity are beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth
noting that the Monterey Bay Aquarium among others does
not keep marine mammals in captivity for just these reasons.
[33] This paper was completed thanks to support from the
Mellon Foundation. Completion of this paper would not have
been possible without the many colleagues and friends who
talked about and visited aquariums with me, read drafts, and
otherwise gave me feedback at various stages. Thanks to
Dominic Lopes and John Beatty for their help and guidance on
this project from its earliest stages. Thanks to Matt Bateman,
James Genone, Rachel Goodman, Nick Kroll, and Glenn Ross
for an invaluable discussion of the paper. I would also like to
thank the anonymous reviewers at Contemporary Aesthetics
for thoughtful comments that helped me improve the quality
of the arguments and the writing.

